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STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT POWER
AND THE 1994-1995 TERM OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT
By FRANK J. MACCHIAROLA*
The 1994-1995 term of the United States Supreme Court continued the trend of shifting power from traditional federal domain to
state and local governments. The power of the national government has not been as challenged by the countervailing political
power of the states since the New Deal. The Supreme Court decisions expanding the power of state and local government are not
the only steps taken towards increasing state power. Attempts to
modify the post-New Deal federal system of government have
taken many forms.
I.

SETTING THE STAGE FOR INCREASED STATE

POWER

The increase in the power of state and local government was
exemplified in the Supreme Court's 1992 decision New York v.
United States.' In this opinion, the Court invalidated the Federal
Waste Act,2 eliminating the provision which required New York to
dispose of its nuclear waste in a manner mandated by federal
guidelines.' In the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor determined
that Congress had invaded New York State's sovereignty by rewriting its law to compel state expenditures in order to comply
with federal requirements. 4 The Court reasoned that Congress
was blurring the lines of authority, and therefore accountability,
* L.B., Ph.D., Columbia University; Dean and Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, and Professor of Political Science, Yeshiva College, Yeshiva University. The
author would like to express his gratitude to Elana Waksal and Robert Herskovits for their
assistance in writing this article.
1 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
2 Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, § 3(a)(1)(A), as amended by 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(c)(a)(1)(A) (1994).
3 N.Y., 505 U.S. at 149-50.
4 N.Y., 505 U.S. at 188; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2061 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that courts are to take back seat to sovereignty of states
in the area of school desegregation as states have historically been sovereign in area of
education).
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that separate the state and national governments. 5 With budget
constraints foreseeable, the Supreme Court warned Congress not
to encumber state government with such costly requirements. 6
In another important decision, Shaw v. Reno, 7 the federal requirements of the Voting Rights Act8 were scaled back considerably, sending a similar message, that a state's authority to create
legislative districts should not be impinged.
This call for increased state power is clearly reflected in legislative proposals advocating block grant programs, calling for the
downsizing of the national government, and of course, in the
GOP's "Contract with America." Indeed, one of the most significant consequences of the 1994 national elections has been the attempt of the Republican controlled Congress to shift the political
power to state and local governments. Congress has clearly indicated that state and local control of government programs, even
those which are federally funded, is preferred over a national
bureaucracy.
Such sentiment is evidenced by the proposed "Personal Responsibility Act."9 This program would supplant the current federal
benefits program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children1 0
("AFDC"), with block grants to the states. Currently, states must
adhere to a considerable number of federal regulations to receive
AFDC funds. In order to tailor the benefits program to their specific needs, states must first apply for a federal waiver. Although
the granting of waivers has become more frequent because of state
protest, the process of obtaining approval is often difficult and
5 N.Y., 505 U.S. at 168 (indicating that compliance with federal policy choices is ultimately up to state residents); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing for separation of
state and national governments); Frank J. Macchiarola, The Courts in the PoliticalProcess:
Judicial Activism or Timid Local Government, 9 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 703, 703
(1994) (suggesting erosion of separation of powers doctrine as result of blurring of line separating branches of government).
6 N.Y. v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992). Citizens of a state can choose to deny a
federal grant or choose to have the federal government rather than the state pay the costs
of a federally mandated program. Id.
7 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-73 (1994).
9 See Carolyn S. Salisbury, The Legality of Denying State Foster Care to Illegal Alien
Children:Are Abused and Abandoned Children the First Casualties in America's War on
Immigration, 50 U. MLAim L. REv. 633, 638 (1996). The Personal Responsibility Act is one of
ten acts which, in the aggregate, comprise the Republican's Contract with America. Id.
This Act would "significantly curtail public benefits to American citizens and noncitizens."

Id.

10 See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1994); 45 C.F.R. § 301.10 (1994).
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time consuming. Block grants, on the other hand, limit restrictions of state discretion.
The shift away from federal control, however, transcends party
lines. Many Democrats, especially state governors, have expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the supervision of the
national government's bureaucracy and the application of federal
rules. Vermont Governor Howard Dean, speaking on behalf of the
National Governors' Association regarding the Personal Responsibility Act, stated that: "Governors have called for increased flexibility in welfare programs. We believe there is no one-size-fits-all
solution to welfare, and states must have the flexibility to develop
these programs and services that will address the unique characteristics of their welfare population and economic conditions
within their individual states."1 State officials have long protested the intrusive nature of the federal government and the
strength of the federal bureaucracy to shape and control decisions
which are more appropriately made at local levels.
President Bill Clinton has also expressed his support of greater
state autonomy. While Governor of Arkansas, President Clinton
often proposed that the federal government grant greater flexibility to the states. Since taking office, President Clinton has
granted states certain exemptions from federal rules in order to
structure their own programs. The Clinton administration, for instance, has granted waivers to twenty-nine states seeking to tailor
the AFDC program. Although President Clinton favors welfare
reform, he opposes the block grant solution introduced by the
"Contract with America." While speaking to the National Governors' Association, President Clinton remarked: "I'm opposed to
welfare reform that is really just a mask for Congressional budget
cutting, which would send you a check with no incentives or requirements on states to maintain your own funding support for
12
poor children and child care and work."
President Clinton's January 1996 State of the Union Address,
however, indicated continued support for the trend toward greater
local power. He expressed his belief that a new smaller government must work together with all citizens through state and local
11 Gov. Howard Dean, Remarks on Behalf of the National Governors' Association Before
the House Committee on Ways and Means, Fed. News Serv. (Jan. 12, 1995).
12 President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks to the National Governors' Association,
31 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1342 (July 31, 1995).
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governments. Furthermore, he announced the elimination of
16,000 pages of unnecessary rules and regulations, which would
shift certain decision-making power out of Washington and back
to the states and local communities. While President Clinton did
claim that the era of big government was over, he also cautioned
against returning to the era where states had to fend for
themselves. 13
II.

THE 1994-1995

TERM: THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE

The Judicial effect of Executive and Legislative proposals regarding changes to the federal government has yet to be fully determined. The following decisions from the 1994-1995 term of the
Supreme Court, however, tend to support increased state and local government power.
Perhaps the most illustrative of these Supreme Court decisions
is United States v. Lopez. 14 In Lopez, the Court struck down a provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,15 which prohibited the knowing possession of a gun in a school zone. 16 The
Court's action was based on the determination that Congress had
exceeded its authority in enacting such legislation under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 17 The Court explicitly found that possession of a gun in a school zone was not an
economic activity that would substantially affect interstate commerce. 1- This was an extraordinary departure from a line of cases
commencing in the New Deal era, which provided Congress with
unfettered authority to use the Commerce Clause as the basis for
enacting virtually any legislation with some type of national purpose. In fact, the trend was so ingrained in tradition that congressional findings regarding the impact of the law on interstate commerce were not even included in the legislative record. 19
13 President William Jefferson Clinton's State of the Union Address: "America Must
Lead", N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 24, 1996, at A15 (indicating President's concern of returning to
time when states were fending for themselves).
14 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
15 Id. at 1626.
16 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(a) (1994).
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (empowering Congress to regulate Commerce among
states).
18 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (stating that Gun-Free School Zones Act "contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce").
19 See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995) (citing Brief for United States
pp. 5-6).
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The five-to-four majority in Lopez was limited in focus, making
it difficult to predict whether the opinion will affect future decisions involving the Commerce Clause. In any event, Lopez will
now require Congress to be more attentive in determining
whether the activity it seeks to regulate falls within the ambit of
federal concern. Given the longstanding practice of enacting federal legislation under the Commerce Clause, Lopez represents an
important adjustment in Congress's approach in passing
legislation.2"
Two other cases, City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. ,21 and
Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston 2 2 however, subordinated the powers of local and state government to superior federal statute and First Amendment claims. In
City of Edmonds, the City argued that its local zoning code did not
permit for a group home, housing ten to twelve recovering alcoholics and drug addicts.2 3 The Federal Government argued that
the City's zoning code did not comport with the Fair Housing Act
("FHA"), prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities by exempting group homes from local zoning code prohibitions. 24 The City argued that this FHA constraint was not applicable since the zoning code was designed only to restrict the
maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.2 5
The Court disallowed the City this exemption, finding that while
the exemption was designed to cover population density, the City
was attempting to define the size and composition of a family, and
hence it was promoting a classic land use restriction.2 6
In Hurley, the Supreme Court considered the right of a homosexual group to march in Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade. The
organizers of this parade, South Boston Allied War Veterans
Council, were a private group. This group had been prevented
from barring participation by the homosexual marchers pursuant
to Massachusetts' state law prohibiting denial of access to public
20 See Ronald A. Giller, Note, Federal Gun Control in the United States: Revival of the
Tenth Amendment, 10 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 151, 165 (1994) (noting Supreme
Court's demand that Congress clearly articulate constitutional basis for its actions when it
attempts to expand its power).
21 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995).
22 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
23 City of Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1779.
24 Id. at 1779; see 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
25 City of Edmonds, 115 S. Ct. at 1776.
26 City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1783 (1995).
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accommodations on the basis of a number of grounds, including
sexual orientation." In agreement with a lower court case on a
similar matter involving New York City's St. Patrick's Day
Parade, the Supreme Court ruled that the parade organizers'
right to bar the homosexual participants was protected by the
First Amendment. 28 The Court held that the freedom of speech
gave the parade organizers the right to bar groups who did not
adhere to their point of view, notwithstanding state law.2 9
Furthermore, the Hurley Court determined that the state's interpretation of its law had, in effect, required private parade promoters to modify the content of their own expression." Justice
Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, found this an improper
objective.31 Since no other legitimate objective was advanced by
the State, the application of state law to this situation was a violation of free speech, as protected by the First Amendment. 2
Legislative Apportionment of Districts
Other areas of considerable significance to state and local government that came before the Supreme Court included political
concerns such as legislative apportionment of districts and term
limitations for Congress. In Miller v. Johnson,33 the Supreme
Court elaborated on the rule previously established by Shaw v.
Reno.3 4 Shaw had invalidated congressional districts in North
27 MASS GEN. LAws § 272:92A (West 1992) (stating that "[n]o owner, lessee, proprietor,
manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation, resort
or amusement shall... in any way ... intend to discriminate against persons of any...
sexual orientation.... ."); see also U.S. CONST amend I (providing, in part, that "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble").
28 Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338,
2349 (1995) (recognizing that no legitimate interest was asserted in support of applying
statute in way that justified abridging First Amendment rights); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech....
or the right of the people to peaceably assemble .... "). See generally LAWRENCE H. TRmE,
AmEIcAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAw §§ 12-26 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing vital role of freedom of
association in society and need to have protection of such right from State infringement).
29 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2349.
30 Id. at 2350.
31 Id. at 2341 (holding that requiring private citizens who organize parade to include
among marchers a group imparting message that organizers so not wish to convey, violates
First Amendment).
32 See id. at 2350; U.S. CONST. amend. I (noting that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech ....
33 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
34 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1995) (declaring that legislation although race-neutral on its
face, had effect of racial gerrymandering); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66
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Carolina as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution. 5 Justice O'Connor, writing for a five
to four majority, found that the decision creating districts was
based on race. Subsequent to the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a twelfth seat in the United States House of Representatives. The North Carolina General Assembly enacted a reapportionment plan which was subsequently rejected by the
United States Attorney General, as violative of Section Five of the
Voting Rights Act.3 6 As a result, the General Assembly created a
new districting plan. The question before the Court was whether
the revised plan, consisting of irregularly shaped boundaries, repThe Court
resented an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
found that minority groups, African-Americans, in this case,
would be favored in congressional elections.
In Shaw, the complainants had not protested that the plan diluted the white vote, rather, they alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race violated their constitutional right to participate in a "color-blind"
electoral process.3 The Court stated that race-conscious decisionmaking is not per se unconstitutional.3 9 It concluded, however,
that when districting is so irregular, it can only be seen "as an
(1964) (stating that overriding goal of legislative apportionment is "fair and effective representation for all citizens").
35 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
36 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994). This section prohibits jurisdictions from implementing
changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization. Id. The jurisdiction must obtain either a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia declaring that the proposed change "does not have
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color," or administrative pre-clearance from the Attorney General. Id.; see also
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819-21. The Court noted the unusual shapes of the two majority-black
districts at issue formed through gerrymandering. Id.
37 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819-20; see also Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and
the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments MasqueradingAs Moral Claims, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 184 (1994) (describing court-made dilemma surrounding "color-blind"
district apportionment); cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (announcing theory of "color-blind" Constitution), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation of children in public schools solely on
basis of race deprives children of minority group equal education opportunities, thus violating Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
38 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (rejecting appellants' argument that apportionment was per
se unconstitutional because it was race-based).
39 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1995) (making distinction between race-conscious and race-based decision making); see Gomillian v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960)
(holding that changing of boundaries of city from square to "twenty-eight-sided figure" was
deemed to be race-based). But see Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2842 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
redistricting met strict scrutiny standard).
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effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard
for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification."4"
In describing the composition of the new districts in North Carolina, Justice O'Connor quoted a legislative member as saying, "[i]f
you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill
most of the people in the district."4 1 Justice O'Connor found that
the composition of the districts was designed in a manner that
would be "unexplainable on grounds other than race."4 2 Justice
"bears
Stevens, in a concurring opinion, indicated that the process
43
an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid."
Two years later, in Miller v. Johnson,4 4 the Court invalidated
the method by which Georgia had manipulated the composition of
its congressional districts as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. 4 5 The Georgia districts were deemed problematic because
"[t]he populations of the . . . district[s] are centered around four
discrete, widely spaced urban centers that have absolutely nothing to do with each other and stretch the district hundreds of
miles across rural counties and narrow swamp corridors."4 6 Georgia defended the redistricting plan as being in compliance with
pre-clearance standards of Section Five of the Voting Rights Act.4 7
Indeed, the State had been in compliance with the Justice Department's interpretation of the Voting Rights Act.48
Arguably, such districting effectuated the election of more African-Americans from the State of Georgia to Congress. In Miller,
40 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
41 Id. at 2821.
42 Id. at 2825 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977)).
43 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827 (asserting that such districting fosters perception that those
of same skin color share political philosophies).
44 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
45 Id. at 2493 (noting purpose of Voting Act is to erase racial gerrymandering); see Robert A. Curtis, Race-based Equal Protection Claims After Shaw v. Reno, 44 DUKE L.J. 298,
300 (1994) (positing that after Shaw, plaintiffs are more likely to survive motion to dismiss
under Equal Protection Clause). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing, in
relevant part, that "[n]o state shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws").
46 Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490-91 (finding mere compliance with Justice Department's
standards was not persuasive argument or excuse); cf David G. Savage, RebuildingAffirmative Action: The Court 'Strict Scrutiny'for all Official Race-Based Programs,81 A.B.A. J.
42, 42 (1995) (detailing effect of O'Connor's opinion in Shaw).
47 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994) (establishing violation of right to vote based on race or color
through voting qualifications).
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c); Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484-85 (describing lengths to which

state went in complying with standard set by Justice Department).
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the Court's analysis went beyond the bizarre shape of the districts
and invalidated them pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause.
The plurality opinion of Justice Kennedy, adopted by Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, with whom Justice O'Connor concurred, examined the plan under the strict scrutiny standard of
review. The Court rejected the argument that such districting
had been insisted upon by the United States Department of Justice.4 9 The Court's analysis made it clear that race-based factors,
rather than the traditional notions of "compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions,"
predominated in the re-districting plan.5 0
The standard enunciated in Miller would seem to require that
every state with a substantial minority population using the traditional approach to the Voting Rights Act, face review of its districting. The difficulty was also compounded in Miller, because
the Court failed to clarify the proper standard of review.
The standards of the Voting Rights Act as established by the
preceding case law, and by the interpretation of the Justice Department,5 1 did require the kind of gerrymandering that was in49 Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2484 (1995) (recognizing voting district linked by
narrow corridors of black neighborhoods).
50 See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2821 (1993) (noting that traditionally districting
had been determined by "compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions"); see also Michael J. Moffett, Note, The Death of the Voting Rights Act or
an Exercise in Geometry?-Shaw v. Reno Provides More Questions Than Answers, 22 PEPP.
L. REV. 727, 782 (1995) (concluding that since Voting Rights Act was enacted, protection of
minority voting rights has been prevalent).
51 Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2493 (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)). The
Department of Justice followed a plan drafted by the American Civil Liberties Union titled
the max-black plan. Id. at 2492. A key element of the plan was the Macon/Savannah trade
whereby "the dense black population in the Macon region would be transferred from the
Eleventh District to the Second, converting the Second into a majority-black district, and
the Eleventh District's loss in black population would be offset by extending the Eleventh
to include black population in Savannah." Id. at 2484. Pointing to the General Assembly's
refusal to enact the Macon/Savannah swap into law, the Justice Department concluded
that Georgia had "failed to explain adequately its failure to create a third majority-minority District." Id. Representative Tyrone Brooks is quoted as recalling that the Attorney
General "specifically told states covered by the [Voting Rights] Act that wherever possible,
you must draw majority black districts." Ia. at 2492. The Justice Department took the position that if alternative plans demonstrated that more minority districts could be drawn
than the state was proposing to draw that did in fact violate the Voting Rights Act. Id.
According to the opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia, the Department of Justice adopted a maximization policy and "followed it in objecting to Georgia's first two plans." Id. One of the two Department of Justice line attorneys
overseeing the Georgia preclearance process disclosed that "what we did.., was to take a
map of the State of Georgia shaded for race, shaded by minority concentration, and overlay
the districts that were drawn by the State of Georgia and see how well those lines adequately reflected black voting strength." Id. at 2492-93. In utilizing Section Five to require
states to create majority-minority districts wherever possible, the Department of Justice
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validated in both Shaw and Miller. The Court held that the Department's maximization policy was far removed from the purpose
of Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, which was to "insure that
no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to
their effective exercise of the electoral franchise."-2 Further, since
districts are held to extremely strict standards of population
equality,53 finding even one congressional district within a state to
be infirm would require virtually every other district within the
state to be involved in any solution to such a deficiency. This creates an enormous problem in terms of judicial and political
inconsistencies.
In a somewhat tenuous concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
sought to mollify those fears by claiming that most of the nation's
congressional districts were not in jeopardy. The basis for her position stands alone between two opposing blocs. The difficulty of
defending a middle ground in the face of strong opposition makes
it probable that the issue of voting rights and the legitimacy of
creating special districts for minority groups will soon be revisited
by the Supreme Court.
As with many other related cases this session, Miller was met
with spirited opposition from dissenting members of the Court.
Justice Stevens related the districting matter to the historic mistreatment of minorities in the electoral process. 54 Accordingly, he
sought to apply a more lenient standard of review. 5
Justice Ginsburg, in a separate dissent, argued that imposition
of a standard which eradicated districts based on "race as a dominant factor," 56 would improperly take the re-districting function
from the legislature. It would grant powers to judges that have
expanded its authority under the statute beyond what Congress intended and the Court
has upheld. Id. at 2493.
52 Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2493 (citations omitted).
53 See, e.g., Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2820 (describing process by which jurisdiction must pass
before implementing change in voting practice).
54 Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2497-99 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing
negative aspects of cause of action created by majority in Shaw).
55 Id. at 2498 (suggesting that plan in Miller served more meaningful purpose by increasing representation in black community).
56 Id. at 2500 (noting reasons for reapportionment of district lines were based on race);
see also Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1331 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (analyzing role race
played in formation of districts); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp 408, 431 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (applying "race-a-motivating-factor" triggering test).
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historically and inherently resided with the legislative branch of
57
government.
Since Miller, other states have initiated suits challenging the
apportionment of congressional districts.5" As promised, the matter again came before the Supreme Court during the 1995-1996
term. Cases heard during December of 1995 involved the constitutionality of legislative districts in North Carolina and in Texas.
The oral arguments focused on Justice O'Connor's position, since
she was the swing vote in Miller. Moreover, arguments against
the race-based districting plans contend if race is the motivating
factor in the creation of a legislative district, the district must fail
59
under the strict scrutiny test.

B.

Term Limits

In United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton60 the Supreme
Court restricted the rights of states to enact legislation contrary to
the United States Constitution. In the five-to-four decision, the
Court was strongly divided and the opposition to the Court's opinion took the form of a strong and remarkably expansive view of
state power. The term limits controversy forced judicial inquiry
into the question of whether the individual states may limit the
terms of their Representatives in Congress. 61 Although the Court
responded to this question in the negative, a deep split among the
Court's members surfaced as to the proper division of authority
between the states and the federal government.
The controversy commenced when Arkansas voters modified
their state constitution to prohibit any person who had already
served three terms in the House or two terms in the Senate from
appearing on the ballot for Congress.62 This provision was similar
to term limit provisions that had been adopted either by statute or
57 See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2500 (stating that political issues are better left to
legislature).
58 See, e.g., Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1304; Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 408; see also Paul M.
Barrett, O'ConnorSuggests Path on Race Based Redistricting,WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1995, at
B8 (addressing one hispanic "tow block" congressional district in Texas).
59 Bush v. Vera, 1995 WL 789899 (U.S. Oral Arg.); Shaw v. Hunt, 1995 WL 729891 (U.S.
Oral Arg.).
60 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1854 (1995) (stating that states retain measure of sovereign immunity, but "only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original
powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government").
61 Id. at 1875.
62 Id. at 1847.
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by state constitutional amendment in twenty-two other states.63
The issue raised concerned the ability of the states to qualify the
criteria for election to the Congress in this manner.
Term limits was decided against the backdrop of several Federal
Constitutional provisions addressing congressional representation. These provisions were the Qualifications Clauses which set
forth specific requirements for Congressional membership. 64 The
key question in Term Limits became whether these clauses provided the exclusive requirements for membership in Congress or
whether they were merely, "minimum requirements" that the
states were free to supplement.65
One of Arkansas' claims was that its provision was merely a ballot-access measure and thus a permissive regulation regarding the
holding elections. 66 Justice Stevens, writing for a five-member majority of the Court, struck down the Arkansas provision as being
beyond the State's constitutional authority.67 The Court concluded
that a contrary ruling would undermine the entire framework of
federalism.68
Term Limits was based upon Powell v. McCormack,69 which
held that Congress could not add qualifications for membership in
the House or Senate to those already contained in Qualifications
Clauses.7 ° In Powell, Congress was not permitted to bar New York
Representative Adam Clayton Powell from taking the Congressional seat to which he had been elected in the prior term.71 While
this ruling did not address the question of state mandated qualifications, the majority took the position that "the people should
choose whom they please to govern them." Arkansas had argued
63 Id.; see, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 18; CoLo. CONST. art. VI, § 49(b); CALIF. ELEC.
CODE § 2500 (3)(a) (West 1996).
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
1-3 (noting requirements for members of House of Repre-

sentatives and Senate).
65 United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1845 (1995); see also
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
2 (requiring each member of House to be at least 25 years old, to
have been citizen of United States for at least seven years, and to be resident of state from
which she is elected); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl.
3 (requiring each member of Senate to be at
least 30 years of age, having nine years of national citizenship and residence in state).
66 Term Limits, 115 S.Ct. at 1851.
67 Id. at 1871.
68 Id. at 1851. "Permitting individual states to formulate diverse qualifications for their
[congressional] representatives would result in a patchwork of state qualifications undermining the uniformity and the national character that the Framers envisioned and sought
to ensure." Id.
69 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
70 Id. at 550.
71 Id. at 533-34.
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that since there are no Constitutional restraints denying this
power it resides with the states.7 2
Justice Thomas's dissent took the position that "[t]he ultimate
source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people
of each individual state, not the consent of the undifferentiated
people of the nation as a whole."7 3 Justice Thomas said that
although the Founders discouraged a Congressional amendment
to the Qualifications Clause, this did not preclude state initiated
alterations. According to Justice Thomas, one reason the Founders wanted to prevent Congress from prescribing the qualifications of its own members was that incumbents could have used
this power to perpetuate themselves in office.7 4 Today, the dissent
argued, incumbents have an electoral advantage, further compelling the preclusion of congressional prescription. 75 The dissent
contended, however, that the Constitution is silent on the issue of
whether the states may supplement the Constitution's congressional eligibility requirements, and that "where the constitution is
federal
silent about the exercise of a particular power . . . [t]he
76
government lacks that power and the States enjoy it."
The majority and the dissent of Term Limits agreed that a key
issue was whether the Framers intended the Qualifications
Clauses to be the exclusive qualifications for congressional membership. 7 7 Justice Thomas found that a role for the states was not
forbidden by the Qualifications Clause. His view was that the
Framers were ambiguous as to the exclusivity of the Qualifications Clauses. 78 Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that in72 United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1852 (1995); U.S. CONST.
amend. X (providing that "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people").
73 Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Henry P. Monaghon,
We the People, Original Understanding,and ConstitutionalAmendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
121, 122 (1996) (discussing recent court decision over dual character of federal government
between state centered approach based on Tenth Amendment and national approach as
seen in Term Limits).
74 Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1877 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See generally Pete DuPont, Pleading the Tenth:
With the Demise of Liberalism, Can FederalismBe Brought Back To Life? 47 NAT'L. REV. 50
(1995) (discussing relative unimportance of Tenth Amendment during period of liberalism
and rise of new federalism after Lopez and Term Limits decisions).
77 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thorton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 81-91 (1995) (describing Court's narrow split over arguments based on constitutional history and context).
78 United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1894-95 (1995) (discussing Framer's diverse views concerning Qualification Clause's exclusivity nature in order to
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dividuals have the right to "choose whom they please" to represent
them in Congress, but he believed that the right is held on a stateby-state basis.7 9 Justice Thomas's dissent shook the "liberal establishment."" ° The New York Times, commented that, "it is only a
slight exaggeration to say that the dissent brought the Court a
single vote shy of reinstalling the Articles of Confederation, the
affiliation of sovereign states that the Constitution replaced with
the federal system in 1789."s '
Affirmative Action
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,s2 another significant
case of the 1994-1995 term, the Supreme Court ruled that the
strict scrutiny test should be applied to evaluate the validity of an
affirmative action program used as the basis for denying a construction contract to the lowest bidder. The case did not directly
involve a state or local government but rather involved a federal
under the
program which under prior case law had been reviewed
3
less stringent "intermediate scrutiny" standard.
In Adarand, the Supreme Court overruled Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC8 4 and determined that all affirmative action programs,
whether federal, state or local government sponsored, should be
conclude that clause is ambiguous); see also Joshua Levy, Note, Can They Throw the Bums
Out? The Constitutionality of State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits, 80 GEO. L. J.
1879, 1923-34 (1992) (discussing qualification clauses from period of Constitution Convention through present in support of proposition that congressional term limits are constitutional). See generally Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution'sForgotten Cover Letter: An Essay
on the New Federalismand the OriginalUnderstanding,94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 622 (1995)
(discussing new post-federalism versus Term Limits based on historical approach to power
given to states during Constitution's creation).
79 Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1891 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "The Arkansas constitutional provision here remains fully within the control of the people of Arkansas. If they
wanted to repeal it [despite the 20 point margin, by which they enacted it less than three
years ago] they could do so by simple majority vote." Id.
80 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Are CongressionalTerm Limits Constitutional? 18 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 48, 50 (1994) (declaring argument of dissent that Qualifications Clause
restrictions apply only to congressional action as inconsistent with language of Constitution and distorts meaning of Framers of Constitution); Ronald D. Rotunda, Rethinking
Term Limits for FederalLegislators in Light of the Structure of the Constitution, 73 OR. L.
REV. 561, 575 (1994) (discussing fact that additional qualifications exist in Article VI,
Clause 3 which prohibit state or federal government from imposing religious qualifications

while mandating certain disqualifications such as age, U.S. citizenship, and state
residency).
81 Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal Power, N.Y. TvmEs, May 24, 1995, at Al (discussing Term Limits and underlying constitutional arguments for majority and dissenting
opinions).
82 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
83 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
84 Id.
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held to the same standard of review. In an indirect way, the Court
enhanced the status of state and local government. By doing so, it
circumscribed the ability of localities to set programs in place to
benefit members of certain racial, ethnic or gender groups. In her
dissent, Justice Ginsburg commented upon the significance of the
change of position by the Court:
Ironically, after all of the time, effort, and paper this Court
has expended in differentiating between federal and state affirmative action, the majority today virtually ignores the issue ....
It provides not a word of direct explanation for its
sudden and enormous departure from the reasoning in past
cases. Such silence, however, cannot erase the difference between Congress's [sic] institutional authority to overcome historical
racial subjugation and the states' lesser power to do
8 5
SO.

D. Education
The Supreme Court decided three cases this term that influenced state and local government that involved issues arising in
educational settings. 86 The first of these cases, Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia8 7 , addressed the
First Amendment, 88 the Establishment Clause,8 9 and Freedom of
Speech 9 ° issues arising when schools provide funding for student
publications. In a five-to-four decision, Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority, held that a public school may not refuse funding
for the publication costs of a student religious organization's
newspaper for the sole reason that the paper manifested a particular religious belief.9 1 The Court held that it could not distinguish
85 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2125 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
86 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2525 (1995)
(determining that withholding University funds from student publications containing
Christian viewpoints constituted viewpoint discrimination); Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct.
2038, 2040 (1995) (determining that District Court's authority to require interdistrict relief
for interdistrict discrimination attack was beyond Court's purpose); Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2387 (1995).
87 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
88 U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom ... of the press. . . ." Id.
89 Id. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ." Id.
90 Id. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech .... " Id.
91 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2513 (1995).
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the case from those situations where secular groups are permitted
to receive funds for doing exactly what the religious groups sought
to do, namely, to present their ideas on particular matters. To bar
them from receiving funds on that basis alone violates their right
to freedom of speech. 9 2 Further, the Court held that granting access to funding on a religious-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of
student groups would not amount to an establishment of
93
religion.

The Court based its decision on the fact that "no public funds
flow directly to [the newspaper's] coffers." 94 Further, the organization publishing the newspaper was not found to be a "religious organization" as defined by either the university's own regulations
or case precedent.9 5 Justice Souter's dissent, joined by Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, objected to the fact that, for the
first time in history, the Supreme Court approved direct funding
96
of core religious activities by a state government.
In Missouri v. Jenkins,9 7 the Supreme Court again was divided
five to four. In this case, the Court reviewed the desegregation of
a Kansas City, Missouri school district. The United States District Court of the Western District of Missouri had imposed expenditure requirements on the Kansas City School District to address
the effects of segregation. The school district was ordered to fund
salary increases for virtually the entire staff of instructional and
non-instructional personnel in the district. Due to low student
achievement levels, the district was ordered to continue to fund
remedial programs which had a significantly high cost. 9 8 The dis92 Id. at 2517.
93 Id. at 2516.
"[I]n determining whether the state is acting to preserve the limits of the forum it has
created so that the exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a
distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination which may be permissible
if it preserves the purpose of the limited forum, and on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise
within the forum's limitation."

Id.
94 Id. at 2523.
9 Id. at 2524.
96 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. at 2510, 2525 (1995).
97 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
98 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2042 (1995). The net result of this funding increase
would have been "high schools in which every classroom will have air conditioning, an
alarm system, and 15 micro-computers." Id. at 2044. It also provided for a:
2000-square-foot planetarium; green houses and vivariums; a 25-acre farm with an
air-conditioned meeting room for 104 people; a Model United Nations wired for language translation; broadcast capable radio and television studios with an editing and
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trict court required inter-district relief by forcing the state of Missouri to participate in the remedy.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivering the majority opinion, found
that inter-district relief was too broadly constructed since the discrimination attack was intra-district. The difficulty was that the
school districts were transferring students, an action which they
did not have the direct remedial power to perform. 9 9 Justice
O'Connor concurred, stating that in order for such a remedy to be
justified, it could be "only upon a showing that there has been a
constitutional violation within one District that produces a significant segregative effect in another District."10 0
Justice Souter, in his dissent, found it unnecessary to examine
the inter-district nature of the remedy. If required to examine the
remedy, Justice Souter contended that the plan was acceptable
since there had been inter-district effects from the de jure segregation historically in place in Kansas City Schools.
Justice Thomas articulated a persuasive anti-federalist argument against remedial powers like those exerted by the Missouri
District Court.10 1 He further contended that such powers might
allow "federal courts to explain the Constitution according to the
reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter
....
This would result in the growth of federal powers and the
entire subversion of the legislative, executive and judicial powers
of the individual states."0 2
The broadening of a local school district's power to monitor student conduct in the area of drug testing was challenged in
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton .103 The question was
animation lab; a temperature controlled art gallery; movie editing and screening
rooms; a 3500-square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics room; a 1875-square-foot elementary school animal rooms for use in a zoo project; swimming pools; and numerous other
facilities.
Id.
99 Id. at 2049 (outlining three-part framework from prior cases to guide lower courts in
exercising their remedial authority).
100 Id. at 2057.
101 Id. at 2070-71. "What the federal courts cannot do at the federal level they cannot do
against the states .... [They] must take into account the interest of the state and local
authorities in managing their own affairs." Id. at 2070-71, 2049. All this is [in light of the
intrusion into the area of education where historically the states have been sovereign and
to which states lay claim by right of history and expertise." Id. at 2061 (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632-33, 1641 (1995)).
102 Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2069 (1995) (quoting Brutus No. 11, Jan. 31,
1788 at 419-20); see also GARY L. McDOWELL, EQurrY & THE CONSTrruTION 43, 44 (1982).
103

115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
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whether the policy adopted by the school district in Vernonia, Oregon, authorizing random urinalysis drug testing of students participating in the school's athletic programs violated the protection
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. 0 0 In Vernonia, the Court held that drug testing was
a search within the auspices of the Fourth Amendment. 10 5 Such a
search, however, was found not to require a warrant or probable
as long as it is "reasonable under the circumstances." 0 6 The circumstances are weighed against the government's interest in conducting the search.
The majority in Vernonia concluded that a minor's participation
in a school athletic program constitutes a voluntary relinquishment of a privacy right.'0 7 They concluded that the search was
justified given the crises of drug use among young American students. The majority contended that the Fourth Amendment's
compelling state interest requirement should be construed as "important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of
other factors which show the search to be relatively intrusive upon
a genuine expectation of privacy. " 1°8 While holding that Oregon's
policy satisfied this test, the majority contended that "the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the evil is
being visited not just upon individuals at large, but upon children
for whom it has undertaken a special responsibility of care and
direction." 10 9
Justices O'Connor, Stevens and Souter, dissented in Vernonia.
They noted that the greatest threats to constitutional freedoms
develop during times of crisis. The dissenters believed that as
government responses can be hysterical overreactions, a compel104 U.S. CONST. amend. I7. The Fourth Amendment guarantees that the Federal Government shall not violate" ... the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . . " Id.; U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No state shall.., deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
105 See Vernonia Sch. District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2390 (1995) (noting that
Fourteenth Amendment extends Fourth Amendment's constitutional guarantee against
'unreasonable search and seizures" to include public school officials); Skinner v. Railway
Lab. Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (holding that testing of customs employees is reasonable under Fourth Amendment); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 657 (1989).
106 Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2390 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV.)
107 Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2392-93.

108 Id. at 2394.
109 Id. at 2395.
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ling state interest must be strictly construed in order to justify an
intrusion on a constitutional right. 1 10
CONCLUSION

As the cases in the 1994-1995 Supreme Court term indicate,
there is no doubt that the recent decisions of the Court are shifting power to state and local governments. In this respect, the
Court joins other political forces in an effort to transfer greater
political power to the state and local level. This shift is further
fueled by public hostility toward a federal government which
many feel is intrusive and is limiting of individual rights. With
many decisions in the area decided by a five-to-four margin, however, it becomes difficult to predict how far these changes will
carry.

110 Veronia Sch. District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2407 (1995).

